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Abstract: Telecommunication economic analysis has largely relied upon a conventional 
economic framework that has its roots in neoclassical analysis that emerged almost a 
hundred years ago, and has contributed to reshaping the direction of economic policies by 
attacking the premises of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and providing far greater 
leeway to incumbents, as well as challenging the economic efficiency of new entrants. 
Common approaches based upon a large number of simplifying assumptions that include, 
for instance, the idea that the technology is exogenous. Such hypotheses make little 
sense at a conceptual level. In addition, this idea is largely contradicted by the short 
period during which the sector achieved some level of competition around the 1900's and 
2000. Not only have economists not thought about any number of such hypotheses, but 
they have also failed to consider how they might have an impact on their analysis. 
Evaluating a number of such issues in this paper, we are able to show how conventional 
economic analysis, uncritically applied to the sector, contributed to the undoing of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act and of much of the competition it helped facilitate. 
Key words: scale and scope, competition, telecommunications industry structure. 
  Introduction: the problem of scale and scope  
as a source of confused assumptions 
The telecommunications industry continues to be dominated by a small 
number of established players, most of whom are incumbents. Yet, 
notwithstanding their continued dominant market position, the prospects of 
                     
1 We are extremely grateful to James Alleman, Dimitris Boucas, Paul David, Catherine de 
Fontenay and Christiaan Hoggendorn for their influential assistance. 
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these players are troubling to financial analysts 2. These worries are fuelled 
by declining numbers of access line 3 and declining prices in the traditionally 
more lucrative parts of the business in particular 4. The uncertain financial 
position of dominant firms, operating in dynamic markets 5 with seemingly 
limitless market opportunity, creates a strange incongruity that applied 
economic analysis is called upon to explain, but has not been able to so far. 
At the same time, the legacy monopoly structure of the industry continues 
to exert considerable influence on today's market even though there has 
been a legislated end to most monopoly-endorsing public policies. This 
influence is rooted in the incumbent's sunk network, which already connects 
most of the population in its serving territory and which, in most cases, can 
be easily upgraded to newer technologies at a far lower cost than 
"evergreen" network builds by new entrants 6. The financial realities have 
thwarted many new entrants, heralding the widespread bankruptcies among 
new entrants witnessed towards the beginning of this decade, even in the 
face of observations that these failed entrants did many things much more 
efficiently than incumbents 7. The financial difficulties encountered by 
                     
2 Consultants Analysys recently commented that: "Most operators are only just managing to 
balance costs and revenues in a market place that is now under intense economic pressure," 
noting specifically that in Europe: "Telecoms competition has been increasing steadily, but is 
only now beginning to affect the overall rate of growth. Fixed network operators are taking the 
brunt of this." (Analysys, 2004b). Typical of financial analyses is Deutsche Bank's Q2 review of 
the U.S. market: "The story was much more mixed on the wireline side. Although the RBOCs 
delivered better than expected revenues and EBITDA, most operating metrics declined faster 
than estimated" (Analysys, 2004a). 
3 For example: "Two years ago, the regional Bells that were created by the 1984 AT&T break-
up looked as if they would emerge as the winners of the telecom bust. As owners of the nation's 
local phone systems, they had what appeared to be a sure-fire advantage: direct lines into 
America's homes and offices. "Now, new technology is hurting the value of that network. The 
Bells have lost some 28 million local phone lines since the end of 2000 – a drop of more than 
18% (Wall Street Journal, 2004, p. A1). 
4 A Deutsche Bank analysis of the U.S. market stated, "We maintain that the market-clearing 
price for the local/LD [long distance] service bundle will collapse from the current typical 
USD50-55 level to USD 35-40 longer-term. Given that the RBOCs have an EBIT break-even 
level of USD 35 per switched access line, such a shift would have a devastating impact on 
profitability." (Wireline Services, p.2, 27 May 2004). 
5 Industry estimates (by Telecommunications Industry Association, for example) claim the 
broader communications sector accounts for as much as one-seventh of the U.S. economy and 
telecommunications is expanding at a rate approaching a compound 9-10%. 
6 In a recent U.S. government-sponsored study, the Computer Science and 
Telecommunications Board, National Research Council estimated that the transformation of the 
existing network to broadband can be accomplished for about 20% the cost of an "evergreen" 
network (National Research Council, 2002). 
7 Examples of this can be seen throughout the functions performed to provide communications 
services, from laying conduit to creating and operating operations support systems, to basic 
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entrants have often been assumed to relate to presumed efficient scale and 
scope economies of incumbent networks. Yet, there is no direct evidence to 
substantiate such assumptions. On the contrary, it appears that such scale 
and scope assumptions boil down to a tautology at best. If sunk network 
technologies exhibit any scale and scope effects on a product level, we 
observe them as characteristics of technologies that were designed and 
adopted by the incumbent in response to the market structure specificity 
they operated in and over which in many, if not most cases, they were able 
to exert conscious choices different to those that might have been dictated 
by market efficiencies. The incumbent, as a monopoly, was absolved from 
any need to respond to market forces and instead could adopt network 
designs and develop technology that furthered its monopoly service 
mandate on some other basis. What we are therefore observing is the 
technology environment of a legacy monopoly and as such, there can be no 
assumptions that this technology is "efficient" in a market-honed economic 
or social welfare sense. Even if scale and scope economies within the 
technology of incumbent's "sunk" networks could be demonstrated, they 
would not have any necessary connection to efficiency. From the standpoint 
of economic welfare analysis, or even profit maximization in the use of 
assets, such observed economies would indicate only how to adjust the use 
of sunk assets, but not whether it would be better to use them differently, or 
to abandon them altogether. 
The technology source of incumbent networks also has consequences 
for policy debate. A fundamentally changed policy from monopoly to 
competition requires a fundamentally changed governance structure. Not 
surprisingly, we observe policy makers and industry members attempting to 
steer policy changes towards a wide variety of often shifting goals such as 
the construction of alternative facilities, unbundling at "wholesale" rates, the 
redefinition of bottlenecks, etc. Much of this debate, however, is 
characterised by a discussion framework rooted in the legacy of the past, 
featuring scant economic analysis regarding the forward-looking impact of 
alternative policies on industry members, the evolution of markets and 
evolving social equity considerations 8. The failure to pursue such an inquiry 
                     
task management. A survey of this phenomenon was presented to the Federal Communications 
Commission in a paper entitled, "Why Inefficient Incumbents Can Prevail in the Marketplace 
over More Efficient Entrants: An Analysis of Economies of Scale and Scope, Transaction Costs, 
and the Misuse of Data", BOURDEAU de FONTENAY Alain & SAVIN A. Brian, 2003, filed in 
FCC Docket 01-337. 
8 The "governance structure" of a sector must not be equated with the narrow concept of 
industry-specific regulation, although the concepts are related. All markets exist pursuant to a 
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has as adverse an impact on would-be entrants, incumbents, consumers 
and the capital markets as policy makers themselves. Without a basic 
understanding of where a changed policy is heading, the policy transition 
itself becomes a blur and business risk assessments become harder to 
manage 9. In the worse case scenario, if business risk rises to the level of 
utter uncertainty, capital will flee the sector. 
Consequently, even though incumbents have mostly survived the 
maelstrom of this sector's recent financial history, they must still compete for 
investors with every other sector. If policy uncertainty or a perceived lack of 
adaptation to market changes prevent their efficient use of capital in a 
forward-looking economic sense, they will ultimately be punished in their 
financial results 10. Here we will unravel the problem of scale and scope 
analysis to show how a misguided approach to the problem has distorted 
markets and regulation, as well as severely affecting competition. In an 
accompanying paper, we also show how an alternative approach to 
modelling will stimulate innovation and provide guidance for the forthcoming 
restructuring of the industry. We will begin with a new reading of 
telecommunications history and then move on to discuss analytical 
approaches (BOURDEAU de FONTENAY & LIEBENAU, 2005). We 
conclude with a discussion of the effects on innovation and industry 
restructuring. 
The central problem inhibiting a better understanding of the scale and 
scope of market forces currently at work today may well be the incumbents' 
perception of themselves – their market position and challenges. Incumbents 
(and indeed most others in the industry, even policy makers with whom 
incumbents feel eternally at loggerheads) naturally continue to look at the 
legacy of vertical (and horizontal) integration as the way to control the 
environment, including what incumbents perceive as the two primary 
sources of uncertainty: competition and innovation. In view of the 
longstanding mindset of monopoly and service obligation, the difficulty of 
                     
governance structure that informs, guides and enforces trading within them. A particular 
market's governance structure may be more or less industry specific. In telecommunications the 
governance structure has historically been monopoly centric, a kind of ex ante regulation of the 
monopoly that goes beyond general-purpose economic regulation. 
9 Economic sociologists have been much more alert than economists in identifying the central 
role stability plays in a firm's objective function (FLIGSTEIN, 2001). 
10 As one major investment bank recently observed in discussing the next-generation network 
build options of American RBOCs, "…We believe there are no easy solutions to the challenges 
facing the RBOCs. One essentially must make a choice between several highly uncertain and 
potentially dilutive outcomes." DB North America analysis, November 11th, 2004. 
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evaluating that environment, and established success in dealing with their 
historical environment, it is understandable that incumbent firms today 
continue to allocate substantial resources to protect their legacy (POSNER, 
1975) 11. 
Nevertheless, established firms now face a highly complex adjustment 
process that will force them to think and act in terms of fundamentally new 
models brought about by increasing collateral entry and innovation. In a 
dynamic market environment, delay in recognizing new and newly possible 
models increases financial risk and limits profit opportunities. 
  Monopoly defines technology, efficiency assumptions 
about legacies are unwarranted; a new reading of 
telecommunications history 
Economists generally assume that the technology of any industrial sector 
is state-of-the-art and known to all, and that firms are bounded and formed 
by the dimensions of that technology (BOWLES, 2004). In other words, 
technology causes firms to look the way they do. The choice of technology is 
presumed efficient, reflecting the firm's incentive to maximise profit and is 
seldom scrutinized for form by economists. On this basis, we have come to 
assume (since SRAFFA, 1926) that a sector with few large firms, often a 
single monopoly, has to reflect the economies of scale inherent in the 
technology of the sector. Applied to telecommunications, the presence of 
such economies of scale justifies both the size and staying power of 
incumbents and why there is not more local competition provided by other 
firms. 
On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the assumed 
relationship between technology and firms has worked the other way around 
in telecommunications. Here, the monopoly selects and shapes the 
technology to serve its own interests. If the technology is endogenous, that 
is, if it becomes a strategic variable managed by the firm in pursuit of its own 
private objectives, then the technology we continue to observe throughout 
existing concentration in the sector cannot be presumed to be socially 
                     
11 Even unwitting internal decisions, taken on a business as usual basis, can influence 
technology and market organization in a transition environment in ways that may not inure to 
the benefit of the firm making those decisions (BULLOCK, 1901; STIGLER, 1971; LEE, 1998). 
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efficient, even if it could be efficient for the firm itself. Indeed, it is generally 
the case that a monopoly largely determines technology to meet its needs. 
Once the efficiency of technology assumption erodes, so does the efficiency 
of any apparent scale and scope economies. With an endogenous 
technology, observed scale and scope economies reflect a market structure-
specific private economic efficiency at best. It may be nothing more than a 
technology the firm selected with the goal of fostering a technological path 
that shelters it from the risk of competition. In other words, such path 
dependence may create an entry barrier that increasingly obstructs 
competition and undermines the socially efficient allocation of assets. 
This situation is clearly illustrated by the history of telephony, where 
systems and entities were built and organized pursuant to a policy design 
that worked outside of competitive market forces – the franchised or 
government controlled monopoly. However, it does not follow that, at least in 
the case of telecommunications, the structures and technology are, from a 
market perspective, efficiently produced. Telephone networks were built to 
fulfil a firm-level planned ubiquitous service policy expectation, and were not 
built in response to competitive market pressures. 
The difference can be easily illustrated by an activity as basic as dialling 
a telephone number. From the standpoint of a monopoly serving a large 
metropolitan area, it might be "efficient" administration to adopt a seven, 
eight or even ten-digit dialling requirement 12. However, people living in 
neighbourhoods might well find added value in remembering and dialling 
only three or four numbers to reach their neighbours. Indeed, short dialling 
was one of the "instant" innovations included in competitive PBX equipment. 
This one example illustrates that, had the market ruled from the beginning, 
even the simplest technology might have looked different than it does today. 
Efficient technology for the monopolist may not be welfare enhancing from 
the standpoint of society or an economic analysis grounded in competition. 
The numbering example illustrates the dimensions of the problem of how 
to transform this formerly monopoly sector into an effectively competitive one 
that can efficiently innovate, and why this understanding is important to 
investors, incumbents and policy makers alike. Blauvelt's dialling plan was a 
significant invention that went far beyond accommodating more subscriber 
addresses. With his system individual subscribers no longer controlled the 
                     
12 W.G. BLAUVELT of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company developed the seven-
digit dialing plan in 1917. 
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routing of their calls. The first three digits represented an address for an 
AT&T switch. That switch would then take control of the call and route it in 
the manner most efficient from the standpoint of AT&T's network. In other 
words, trunking became divorced from the customer's dialling and became 
governed by the telephone company, not the customer. Understanding this 
simple invention, how it came about and was implemented, and the 
underlying assumptions of technology that stemmed from it helps us to 
recognise the continuing primary role of the incumbent in developing 
technology throughout the monopoly period and even in today's market. 
The telephone business started in 1877 as a monopoly built on a series 
of Bell patents, but the original monopoly did not survive after their 
expiration. By the early 1900s, the United States had over 3,000 telephone 
operators and in 1907 competitors already controlled 51% of the telephone 
market. The situation alarmed the Morgan banking interests who, by then, 
financed and controlled AT&T. In 1907 they named Theodore Vail to head a 
revamped AT&T 13. Vail's approach was an acquisition strategy designed to 
expand the company's reach across the country, to reverse its market 
losses, and to protect it from the uncertainties of competition (BORNHOLZ & 
EVANS, 1983; TEMIN, 1987). Vail leveraged AT&T's control over key long 
distance patents, hence, over long distance interconnection to get this new 
foothold 14. In 1908, he coined the motto: "One System, One Policy, 
Universal Service" in a campaign to placate the government's antitrust 
concerns 15 and in 1913 successfully negotiated the Kingsbury Commitment 
with the federal government, essentially gaining government acquiescence 
to the Bell monopoly. 
At that time, economists generally saw a clear dichotomy between utility-
type monopolies and other types of monopolies. The idea that some sectors 
have unique economies of scale dates back to John Stuart Mill (BULLOCK, 
1901) at least. Debates tended to deal more with whether the sector was 
                     
13 Vail worked as general manager and then CEO of the Bell Company in 1878-1887 (OGLE, 
1980). This time, he would stay until 1919. 
14 BROCK (1981) documents how the AT&T system has used its patents to maintain its market 
power throughout its history. 
15 This motto effectively conveyed the AT&T perspective that a commitment by a centrally- 
managed, centrally-owned network to connect virtually everyone in its territorial reach was the 
efficient way to go from an economic policy perspective, thus confronting the government's 
antitrust-based challenge to its acquisition policy directly. His usage of "universal service" 
differed from what later was known as "universal service" in that he used it as a reminder that 
only the Bell System could provide long distance services. 
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best managed as a public or private utility. Vail's solution was original, 
elegant and generally accepted as in line with thinking at the time. 
As a result of Vail's business strategy, and AT&T's successful sale of its 
policy to state and federal governments, the Bell System's control of the 
sector became almost complete. AT&T used its market power both to set 
standards and practices and, of course, to dictate prices 16. It ended the 
practice of requiring customers to provide their own inside wire and hook-up 
points and took over that function. TEMIN (1987), among others, tells us that 
the integration of the telephone set as a part of the telephone network was 
not so much, "Because there were joint costs," but, "Precisely because it 
was so easy for anyone to make a telephone set that Bell could never hope 
to police licenses for their manufacture." Vail's genius was not just to 
convince the government that telephony was a utility, it was also to define 
that utility as the complete, end-to-end system, a system that remained the 
most vertically integrated utility through time. There was no implication that 
the "one system" Vail was talking about was subject to technological 
constraints. The idea that technology was a constraint on the market 
potential of the sector is an "afterthought" that was introduced much later. 
On the other hand, VAIL was certainly, like Ford, among those who best 
understood Bullock's "law of economy in organization" (1902). 
Consequently, throughout the decades, AT&T political disputes were waged 
with the objective of preserving the entity's integration strategy. 
AT&T's integration strategy never had anything to do with the kind of 
calculus described by Coase in his research of 1937 (1988) and 
WILLIAMSON (1971). Their work establishes the boundary between what is 
purchased by a business enterprise on the market and what is integrated 
within the (telephone) company based on what is most efficient, using a 
competitive market benchmark. Under normative analysis, a firm that 
integrates a function that is more efficiently produced within a competitive 
market will put itself at a cost disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors 17. 
AT&T's all-encompassing structure essentially precluded the existence of 
such a competitive market benchmark and shielded it from market discipline. 
Vail's "one system" became the foundation on which the Bell System's 
culture emerged and, through time, created the routines that still permeate 
                     
16 Most operators saw no alternative, but AT&T's monopoly pricing was such that telephone 
companies in Canada decided to build their own transcontinental line instead of having to rely 
on AT&T, and more generally, submit to its terms and conditions (OGLE, 1980). 
17 Correspondingly, the market is the prerequisite to ensuring that vertical integration is 
efficient. 
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the management process, as well as negotiations with the government 
(GRANT & LIEBENAU, 2000) 18. It also created legacy technologies that still 
make it difficult for new entrants and also inhibit innovation by incumbents 
themselves in ways that a few are only just beginning to appreciate. 
Most of the early historical experience with competition is centred in 
North America. However, there are some experiences elsewhere, especially 
in Scandinavia, that can enlighten us as to the market potential of 
telecommunications. In Sweden, competition became so intense with the 
end of the Bell patents that AT&T decided to pull out of the country. At the 
time, telephone rates were lower in Stockholm than they were in U.S. cities, 
a trend that continued for decades. This pricing advantage was achieved in 
spite of the supposed benefits of economies of scale and scope 19. 
After the Bell exit, a latecomer in the Swedish telephone sector, the 
telegraph company Televerket, was able to leverage its technological control 
over long distance services together with its existing infrastructure of poles, 
to gain control over a growing number of competitors, generally following the 
pattern of AT&T. Only recently have regulation and interconnection 
requirements arrived 20. Yet here, too, there is no evidence that scale and 
scope played a role in the costs or industry structure of Swedish 
telecommunications. 
In 1923, Clark concluded that "[t]elephone companies… show no signs of 
economy with increased size, but rather the opposite" 21. Today, a small 
minority of economists argue that those economies are not playing a role 
that is all that significant (ROSSTON & TEECE, 1997). Nevertheless, 
economists rarely challenge the assumed existence of those economies 
(TEECE, 1995). In the absence of proof of scale and scope economies, 
                     
18 Sengupta's (2001) brilliant analysis considers those same dimensions in a far more complex 
process over a much longer historical period. 
19 There are numerous other examples around the world that are consistent with the Swedish 
experience such as Edmonton Telephone (now part of AGT) in Canada, Kingston 
Communications in the U.K., and Rochester Telephone (today's Frontier) in the USA, all small 
operators that were commercially successful and generally more innovative than the major 
incumbents. 
20 The first obligation to interconnect came in the early 1980s, when Televerket was forced by 
the government to interconnect with the second cellular license. Regulation came in the early 
1990s when the Swedish incumbent started to implement its competition policy. 
21 CLARK's (1923) Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs (p. 321) cited by THIERER 
(1994). 
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there is no basis for assuming that incumbents' structures and their current 
organization of assets are performing efficiently. 
  Analytical framework:  
policy change, innovation and investment 
Policy makers, investors and financial analysts have a lot in common with 
a CEO running a business. The CEO is obliged to make the most efficient 
use of the assets investors have assigned to the management's care to 
maximize profits, excluding agency problems. Use of investments and 
innovation are the tools of this trade, and assessment of their use serves as 
the benchmark for financial analysts in their evaluation of management 
performance. Similarly, policy makers engage in economic regulation to 
foster greater economic efficiency and social welfare. Public investment and 
innovation are also the tools of that trade, although policy makers frequently 
do not recognize the extent of the investment required to effect a policy, or 
understand that innovations in government conduct are required to effect the 
desired goal's implementation. In a dynamic environment the challenge is to 
recognize opportunities and problems as they arise and the assumptions we 
hold, especially about scale and scope, make huge differences to the 
conclusions we arrive at. 
One of the best ways to disaggregate the monopoly structure is to look at 
the existence, vel non, of wholesale markets and understand their 
importance and the problems standing in the way of their creation. To begin 
with, there is no basis for assuming that the traditional monopoly vision of 
end-to-end service provisioning is a natural and inevitable product of 
technology. There are literally thousands of functions that take place to build 
and operate networks and provide different services, and for many of them, 
improvements to economic efficiency could arise from desegregation. For 
immediate discussion purposes, we refer to all these intermediate functions 
(and potential markets) together under the heading of "wholesale markets". 
The idea of wholesale markets in telecommunications emerged only once 
the sector had been privatized and opened up to free entry/exit. For 
incumbents, the wholesale concept did not begin as a means of fostering 
greater profits, but as a forced response to policy changes. If a highly 
integrated, former monopoly was now to face competition, would-be 
competitors needed to have the technological means of getting to 
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customers. To a large extent, there was only one practical source of that 
technological means – the incumbent. Additionally, over the years the 
incumbent had incorporated into itself all the many intermediate functions of 
providing telephony, from laying of conduit to network and equipment 
design, to creating standards for interconnection. So there were few 
substitutes not only for the incumbent's network, but also for many of the 
intermediate functions necessarily involved in providing communications to 
end-users. 
The question for incumbent management became, is there greater profit 
to be gained by cooperation or is this policy change only a question of 
sharing "my" existing market with others? If there are considerable legacy 
scale and scope forces at work, then new entrants add little value by 
expanding markets, but only compete for a market already served 
"efficiently" by the incumbent, given the existing technological path. The 
question for would-be investors in entrants becomes, what is the cost/risk 
associated with investment in this market? Is the regulator up to the task at 
hand? The question for policy makers becomes, what is required of us to 
make open entry model feasible? Wholesale access to incumbents' 
resources appeared obvious, but there was little understanding of what 
specifically was going to be required to realize this change of policy or what 
the consequences of it all would be. 
At the core of this set of problems lies the question of scale and scope. If 
large, exogenous economies of scale and scope exist, then a policy that 
forces competition where it conflicts with technology is a policy that imposes 
inefficiency, is wrongly conceived, and cannot be implemented without 
constant intervention. KNIGHT (1925) and SRAFFA (1926) were among the 
first to clearly analyse such a situation. However, where there are not 
significant scale and scope economies, then the monopolization of a sector 
is inefficient and the reluctant incumbent's vertically integrated structure 
obstructs innovation and market growth. In the latter case, an incumbent's 
integrated structure, focused on providing a limited set of end-user services, 
is an albatross for itself, as well as for public welfare. Preserving its 
monopoly will limit the capital applied to the sector and thus also its market 
growth and opportunity. Indeed, in a dynamic market setting, the incumbent 
continually needs to examine its market opportunities and even rethink its 
structure. Following STIGLER (1951), as well as recent work on innovation 
and vertical disintegration by experts like CHRISTENSEN (2000), if we think 
of the incumbent as a collection of assets, in a dynamic setting, these assets 
look less attractive as a vertically integrated monolith. They are more 
usefully evaluated as a conglomerate of businesses that it may, or may not 
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make sense to be engaged in and which may, or may not be maximising 
their profit potential. So, the scale and scope issue is one of the most 
fundamental of questions for all parties. 
  Guideposts on scale and scope from economics 
Existing quantitative findings do not support the conclusion that large 
scale and scope economies exist within the telecoms firm. Yet there is much 
work built upon assumptions that they exist (STEHMAN, 1925; KAHN, 1971; 
MITCHELL & VOGELSANG, 1991; BAUMOL & SIDAK, 1994; HARING, 
2002; SPILLER, 1999; LAFFONT & TIROLE, 2000; ARMSTRONG, 2002; 
National Research Council, 2002; SPULBER & YOO, 2003) 22. Most of this 
work is general and not intended to offer pragmatic guidance for business 
and policy decision-making. However, if it were applied to practical questions 
of telecommunications business planning and policymaking, this body of 
work could mislead in critical ways. 
Most definitions of competition in telecommunications are based on 
concepts of models that consider a single entrant that is essentially trying to 
duplicate what the incumbent is doing. Such a "monopoly-centric" approach 
is an easy path of analysis and is consistent with the hypothesis of a 
technology that is exogenous and known to all. It focuses on incremental 
changes to the established environment and uses the knowledge base 
associated with the status quo. Yet the change of policy that drives the need 
for new modelling is far more than just an incremental change. It is what 
Schumpeter saw as an innovation, and in such cases, it is the official 
responsible for policy implementation: "Who as a rule initiates economic 
change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary; they are, as it 
were, taught to want new things" 23. The official who implements the policy, 
and the investors and incumbent managers who have to deal with it, must 
face a world that does not have a concept of what competition might mean in 
this case other than to realise that it must be something different from what 
people are used to. Consumers, for their part, are not in a position to 
                     
22 Crandall, for instance, noted in 1988 that, "Despite the popular belief that the telephone 
network is a natural monopoly, the AT&T monopoly survived until the 1980s not because of its 
naturalness, but because of overt government policy." 
23 Schumpeter's 1911 book translated in 1934 under the title The theory of economic 
development: an inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle as cited by 
SWEDBERG (1991), p. 35. 
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imagine what a maturely competitive telecommunications environment may 
mean for them. They may imagine lower prices, but how much lower? What 
kinds of new services they can expect? 
If there was no knowledge available relating to the kind of environments 
competition could bring about in telecommunications, it might be impossible 
to imagine the competitive environment other than with monopoly-centric 
environment biases. 
In general it is possible, by combining observations and analogies from 
other sectors, to gain some insight into what that new environment could be 
like and the business strategies that might be successful in harnessing new 
opportunities. One useful approach is to look at the process of 
desegregation that competition brings about when applied to other monopoly 
sectors. STIGLER (1951) describes the process of vertical disintegration and 
innovation that accompanies competition and it is possible to observe some 
elements of the process he describes in telecommunications, both during the 
competitive period around 1900 and the modern competitive period. For 
instance, in France the regional independent construction companies used 
by France Telecom, as well as its competitors build significant portions of 
France Telecom's local infrastructure. Those companies evidently have a 
comparative advantage in construction, facilities management and 
maintenance over the construction departments integrated into the legacy 
service companies. It did not take long for new entrants to discover that 
there were a wide range of rights-of-way and properties available that, with 
some imagination, could be used more cheaply than the methods 
incumbents continue to use 24. That implies that there is the potential for a 
commercial market place for rights of way and construction that is broader 
than telecommunications and can be more efficiently pursued as an 
independent activity. 
                     
24 In North America, incumbents had been sharing poles with public utilities for a long time. 
However, that appears to be more of an administrative than an economic matter. For example, 
they never managed the communication space on poles as a commercial activity. They had to 
be mandated by federal legislation to share those facilities with cable operators and, since 
1996, with new entrants. This sharing has been far less common in other parts of the world. The 
fact that many of those alternatives were cheaper helped new entrants, but did not necessarily 
provide them with a competitive advantage over incumbents. Entrants still had to link those 
other rights-of-way so as to be able to achieve a complete network reaching the desired nodes. 
In the absence of a well-developed specialized construction market, the linking of those piece 
parts was still a costly endeavour. 
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Once the monopoly-centric bias of data is understood, then little of the 
recent analysis that has been applied to explain the plight of competition in 
the sector makes sense. For example, virtually every existing study of new 
entrants' investment incentives, including the innovation dimension of those 
incentives, implicitly uses a monopoly as the benchmark. As a result, they 
deal in aggregate with the firm and cannot disaggregate the layers of 
infrastructure that constitute the network. (JORDE, SIDAK & TEECE, 2000; 
HARING et al., 2002; CRANDALL, 2002; BREYER 2004) 25. 
  Conclusion: "scale economies", integration  
and functional disintegration 
Economies of scale and scope, and vertical integration are at the heart of 
STIGLER's (1951) demonstration that the division of labour need not lead to 
monopolies and therefore we understand that organizational choices require 
skilled and informed management. Stigler, as well as SRAFFA (1926), 
demonstrated that economies of scale and scope cannot be considered 
independent of the vertical integration of tasks 26. 
Higher production levels make it possible to use more efficient production 
techniques, a cornerstone of the theory of the division of labour, a dimension 
upon which CHANDLER (1990) built his analysis of the emergence of 
increasingly large and, eventually, multifunctional and multiproduct firms. 
TIROLE (1988) tells us that engineers confirm Chandler's results. Sraffa's 
observation was that most firms could increase their output substantially 
without increasing their per-unit cost and, potentially, with the possibility of 
reducing it further. BESANKO et al. (2000) discuss the L-shaped curve as 
being far more common than the Viner's U-shaped curve and remarks that, 
"In reality, large firms rarely seem to be at a substantial cost disadvantage 
relative to smaller rivals" (p. 73). Those economies are not necessarily 
                     
25 Those studies are all based on a conventional investment analysis as applied to a mature 
firm competing in a mature and fully competitive static sector, a sector largely free of innovation. 
New entrant investment through venture capital is naturally based upon a totally different model 
(OECD 2002-present; ROBERTSON & GATIGNON, 1998; HELLMAN & PURI, 2000, 2002; 
SAHLMAN, 1990; MARTIN & SUNLEY, 2003). CHRISTENSEN (1997 and 2000) has studied 
the danger of applying conventional investment analysis to innovations and new ventures. 
26 "In classical economics… the law of increasing returns… was much less prominent, as it 
was merely regarded as an important aspect of the division of labour, and thus rather as a result 
of general economic progress than an increase in the scale of production." (p. 537). 
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abstract assumptions, but may be associated with concrete factors such as 
Robinson's "economies of mass reserves." However, care must be taken in 
applying these observations to a sector not maturely competitive, such as 
telecommunications, where the economies engendered by great size are 
less likely to have been the result of efficient technology (insofar as they 
exist at all). 
Economies of scale and scope are properties that are associated with 
technology, the organisation of technology and the technology of the 
organisation. Moreover, as Tirole points out: "Returns to scale have their 
limits." BESANKO et al. (2000) identify capacity bottlenecks, as well as 
agency problems as possible contributors to the eventual emergence of 
diseconomies of scale in a firm. They identify:  
"[…] four major sources of economies of scale and scope economies: 
indivisibilities and the spreading of fixed costs, increased productivity 
of variable inputs (mainly having to do with specialization), inventories, 
[and] the cube-square rule" (p.75).  
All of those sources imply some limits to those economies of scale and 
scope at any point in time or over a finite time period. They do not justify a 
blank assertion regarding the economies of scale and scope of 
telecommunication operators. Interestingly, three of those determinants refer 
not to the firm, but rather to the kind of activities Stigler identifies within a 
firm that is by the normal, proper definition correctly vertically integrated. 
100   No. 60, 4th Q. 2005 
References 
Analysys: 
- (2004a): "Indian Summer at High Noon", August 9th 2004. 
- (2004b): "Industry Comment: Telecom Trends". 
ARMSTRONG Mark (2002): "The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection", in 
CAVE Martin, MAJUMDAR Sumit Kumar & VOGELSANG Ingo (Eds.), Handbook of 
Telecommunications Economics: Structure, Regulation and Competition, New York: 
North-Holland. 
BAUMOL William J. & SIDAK J. Gregory (1994): Toward Competition in Local 
Telephony, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
BESANKO David, DRANOVE David & SHANLEY Mark (2000): Economics of 
Strategy, 2nd edition, New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
BROCK Gerald W. (1981): The Telecommunications Industry: The Dynamics of 
Market Structure, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
BORNHOLZ Robert & EVANS David S. (1983): "The Early History of Competition in 
the Telephone Industry", in EVANS David S. (Ed.), Breaking Up Bell: Essays on 
Industrial Organization and Regulation, New York: North Holland. 
BOURDEAU de FONTENAY Alain, CHAVES Bruno & SAVIN Brian (2003): "Why 
Inefficient Incumbents Can Prevail in the Marketplace Over More Efficient Entrants: 
An Analysis of Economies of Scale and Scope, Transaction Costs and the Misuse of 
Data", Working Paper presented at Columbia University, ATOM, Sorbonne-Université 
de Paris I, January and February 2003. 
BOURDEAU de FONTENAY Alain & HOGGENDORN Christiaan (2005): "The 
Economics of Vertical Integration: Adam Smith, Allyn Young, and George Stigler", 
Working paper and CITI Workshop Reforming Telecom Markets: A Commons 
Approach to Organizing Private Transactions, New York: Columbia University, at: 
http://www.citi.columbia.edu 
BOURDEAU de FONTENAY Alain & LIEBENAU Jonathan: 
- (forthcoming): "Modelling Scale and Scope in the Telecommunications Industry: 
Problems in the Analysis of Competition and Innovation", in COMMUNICATIONS & 
STRATEGIES. 
- (forthcoming): "Innovation in Telecommunications: the Judicial Process and 
Economic Interpretations of Costing, Transacting and Pricing". 
BOWLES Samuel (2004): Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
BREYER Stephen (2004): Economic reasoning and judicial review, AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center 2003 Distinguished Lecture. Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies. 
A. BOURDEAU de FONTENAY, J. LIEBENAU & B. SAVIN 101 
BULLOCK Charles J. (1901): "Trust literature: A survey and a criticism", in Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 15 (2), pp. 167-207. 
CHANDLER Alfred D. Jr. (1990): Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial 
Capitalism, Cambridge, MA: Bellknap. 
CHRISTENSEN Clayton M. (1997): "Making Strategy: Learning By Doing", in 
Harvard Business Review, November-December. 
CHRISTENSEN Clayton M. (2000): The Innovator's Dilemma, New York, N.Y.: 
Harper Business. 
COASE Ronald H. (1988): "The Nature of the Firm", reprinted from Economica, 1937 
as Chapter 2 in The Firm, The Market, and the Law, Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
CRANDALL Robert W.: 
- (1988): "Surprises with Telephone Deregulation and with AT&T Divestiture", in 
American Economic Review, 78 (2), 323-327. 
- (2002): "An Assessment of the Competitive Local Exchange Carriers Five Years 
after the Passage of the Telecommunications Act", in Criterion Economics, June 
2001, revised January 2002. 
Deutsche Bank (2004): Newsletter, November. 
ECONOMIDES Nicholas (1997): "The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR", Working 
Papers 98-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, 
Department of Economics. 
FLIGSTEIN Neal (2001): The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of 
Twenty-First-Century Societies, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
GRANT Gerard & LIEBENAU Jonathan (2000): "The Strategic Dimensions of 
Information Systems Capability: An Evolutionary and Resource-based View", 
Typescript. 
HARING John (2003): "Telecommunications", in The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics, at:  
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Telecommunications.html (January 2003). 
HELLMANN Thomas & PURI Manju (2000): "The Interaction between Product 
Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital", in The Review of 
Financial Studies, 13 (4), 959-984. 
HELLMANN Thomas & PURI Manju (2002): "Venture Capital and the 
Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical Evidence", in Journal of Finance, 57 
(1), pp. 169–197. 
JORDE Thomas M., SIDAK J. Gregory & TEECE David J. (2000): "Innovation, 
Investment, and Unbundling", in Yale Journal on Regulation, 17 (1), pp. 1-37. 
102   No. 60, 4th Q. 2005 
KAHN Alfred E. (1971): The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
KNIGHT Frank H. (1925): "On Decreasing Cost and Comparative Cost", in Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 39 (2), pp. 331-333. 
LAFFONT Jean-Jacques & TIROLE Jean (2000): Competition in Telecommunic-
ations, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
LEE Kong-Rae (1998): The Sources of Capital Goods Innovation: The Role of User 
Firms in Japan and Korea, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
MARTIN Ron & SUNLEY Peter (2003): "Deconstructing Clusters: Chaotic Concepts 
or Policy Panacea?", in Journal of Economic Geography, 3, pp. 5-35. 
MITCHELI Bridger M. & VOGELSANG Ingo (1991): Telecommunications Pricing: 
Theory and Practice, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
National Research Council, National Academy of Science (2002): Broadband: Taking 
Home the Bits, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press. 
OGLE E.B. (1980): Allô, l'interurbain! L'historique du réseau téléphonique 
transcanadien, Montréal, Canada: Editions Pierre Tisseyre. 
POSNER Richard A. (1975): "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation", Journal 
of Political Economy, 83, 807-827. 
ROBERTSON Thomas S. & GATIGNON Hubert (1998): "Technology Development 
Mode: A Transaction Cost Conceptualization", in Strategic Management Journal, 19 
(6), pp. 515-531. 
ROSSTON Gregory L. & TEECE David J. (1997): "Dynamics of the New Local 
Telecommunications Markets", in NOAM Eli M. & WOLFSON Alex J. (Eds), 
Globalism and Localism in Telecommunications, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 
pp. 1-26. 
SAHLMAN William (1990): "The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital 
Organizations", in Journal of Financial Economics, 27, pp. 473–521. 
SCHUMPETER Joseph A. (1934): The Theory of Economic Development, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (first published in German in 1911). 
SENGUPTA Nirmal (2001): A New Institutional Theory of Production: an Application, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
SPILLER Pablo T. (1999): "Institutions and Commitment", in CARROLL Glenn R. & 
TEECE David J. (Eds), Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
SPULBER Daniel F. & YOO Christopher S. (2003): "Access to Networks: Economic 
and Constitutional Connections", in Cornell Law Review, 88. 
A. BOURDEAU de FONTENAY, J. LIEBENAU & B. SAVIN 103 
STEHMAN J. Warren (1925): The financial history of the American Telegraph and 
Telephone Company, Boston, MA: Hoghton Mifflin. 
SRAFFA Piero (1926): "The Law of Returns Under Competitive Conditions", in 
Economic Journal, December 1926. 
STIGLER George J.:  
- (1951): "The Division of Labour is Limited by the Extent of the Market", in The 
Journal of Political Economy, 59 (3). 
- (1971): "The Theory of Economic Regulation", in Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2, pp. 3-21. 
SWEDBERG Richard (1991): Schumpeter: A Biography, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
TEECE David J. (1995): "Telecommunications in Transition: Unbundling, 
Reintegration, and Competition", in Michigan Telecommunications Technology Law 
Review 47, at: http://www.mttlr.org/volone/teece.html. 
TEMIN Peter (1987): The fall of the Bell System, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
THIERER Adam D. (1994): "Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the 
Development of the Bell System Monopoly", 14 (2).  
TIROLE Jean (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIIT 
Press. 
WILLIAMSON Oliver (1971): "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations", in American Economic Review, 61, pp. 112-125. 
 
